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Valley Spirit: July 31, 1867 Go To Page : 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The Veto Message
(Column 5)

Summary: Contains a copy of President Johnson's veto of the Reconstruction Bill.

Full Text of Article:

To the House of Representatives of the United States:--I return herewith the bill entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled an act to provide for the more efficient government of the Rebel States," passed on the 2nd day of March, 1867, and the act supplementary thereto, passed on the 23rd day of March 1867, and will state, as briefly as possible, some of the reasons which prevent me from giving it my approval.

This is one of a series of measures passed by Congress during the last four months on the subject of Recenstruction. The message returning the act of the 2nd of March last, states at length my objections to the passage of that measure; they apply equally well to the bill now before me, and I am content merely to refer to them, and to reiterate my conviction that they are sound and unanswerable. There are some points peculiar to this bill which I will proceed at once to consider.

The first section purports to declare the true intent and meaning, in some particulars, of the prior acts upon this subject. It is declared that the intent of those acts was, first, "That the existing governments in the ten rebel States" were not legal State governments; and second, "That thereafter, said governments, if continued, were to be continued subject in all respects to the military commanders of the respective districts, and to the paramount authority of Congress." Congress may, by a declaratory act, fix upon an act a construction altogether at variance with its apparent meaning, and from the time at least when such construction is fixed the original act will be construed to mean exactly what it is stated to mean by the declaratory statute. There will be then, from the time this bill may become a law, no doubt, no question as to the relation in which the existing governments in those States called in the original act the "provisional governments," stand towards the military authority. As their relations stood before the declaratory act, these "provisional governments," it is true, were made subject to absolute military authority in many important respects, but not in all the language of the act being subject to the military authority of the United States as hereinafter provided."

By the sixth section of the original act these governments were made "in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States." Now, by this declaratory act it appears that Congress did not, by the original act, intend to limit the military authority to any particulars or subjects therein "prescribed," but meant to make it universal. Thus, over all these ten States, this military government is now declared to have unlimited authority. It is no longer confined to the preservation of the public peace, the administration of criminal law, the registration of voters, and the superintendence of elections, but in all respects is asserted to be paramount to the existing civil governments. It is impossible to conceive any state of society more intolerable than this, and yet it is to this condition that twelve millions of American citizens are reduced by the Congress of the United States. Over every foot of the immense territory occupied by these American citizens, the Constitution of the United States theoretically is in full operation. It binds all the people there, and should protect them: yet they are denied every one of its sacred guaranties. Of what avail will it be to any one of these Southern people, when seized by a file of soldiers, to ask for the cause of arrest or for the production of the warrant? Of what avail to ask for the privilege of ball when in military custody, which knows no such thing as bail? Of what avail to demand a trial by jury, process of witnesses, a copy of the indictment, the privilege of counsel, or that greater privilege, the writ of habeas corpus?

The veto of the original bill of the 2nd of March was based on two distinct grounds, "the interference of Congress in matters strictly appertaining to the reserved powers of the States, and the establishment of military tribunals for the trial of citizens in time of peace." The impartial reader of that message will understand that all it contains with respect to military despotism and martial law has reverence especially to the fearful power conferred on the district commanders to displace the criminal courts and assume jurisdiction to try and to punish by military boards; that potentially the suspension of the habeas corpus was martial law and military despotism. The act now before me declares that the intent was to confer such military authority over all the other courts of the State, and over all the officers of the State, legislative, executive and judicial. Not content with the general grant of power, Congress, in the second section of this bill specifically gives to each military commander the power to "suspend or remove from office, or from the performance of official duties and the exercise of official power, any officer or person holding or exercising, or professing to hold or exercise any civil or military office or duty in such district under any power, election, appointment, or authority derived from or granted by or claimed under any so-called state, or the government thereof, or any municipal or other division thereof, a power that hitherto all the departments of the Federal Government, acting in concert or separately, have not dared to exercise, is here attempted to be conferred on a subordinate military officer. To him, as a military officer of the Federal Government, is given the power, supported by "a sufficient military force," to remove every civil officer in the State. What next? The district command, who has thus displaced the civil officer, is authorized to fill the vacancy by the detail of an officer or soldier of the army, or by the appointment of some other person. This military appointee, whether an officer, a soldier or some other person, is to perform the duties of such officer or person so suspended or removed. In other words, an officer or soldier of the army is thus transformed into a civil officer.

He may be made a governor, a legislator or a judge. However unfit he may deem himself for such civil duties he must obey the order. The officer of the army must, if detailed, go upon the Supreme Bench of the State with the same prompt obedience as if he were detailed to go upon a court-martial. The soldier, if detailed to act as a justice of the peace, must obey as quickly as if he were detailed for picket duty.-What is the character of such a military civil officer? This bill declares that he shall perform the duties of the civil office to which he is detailed. It is clear, however, that he does not lose his position in the military service. He is still and officer or soldier of the army. He is still subject to the rules and regulations which govern it, and must yield due deference, respect and obedience towards his superiors. The clear intent of this section is, that the officer or soldier detailed to fill a civil office must execute its duties according to the laws of the State. If he is appointed a Governor of a State he is to execute the duties as provided by the laws of that State, and for the time being his military character is to be suspended in his new civil capacity. If he is appointed a State Treasurer he must at once assume the custody and disbursement of the funds of the State, and must perform these duties precisely according to the laws of the State, for he is intrusted with no other official duty or other official power.-Holding the office of treasurer, and intrusted with funds, it happens that he is required by the State laws to enter into bond with security, and to take an oath of office; yet, from the beginning of the bill to the end there is no provision for any bond or oath of office, or for any single qualification required under the State law, such as residence, citizenship, or anything else. The only oath is that provided for in the ninth section, by the terms of which every one detailed or appointed to any civil office in the State is required "To take and to subscribe the oath of office prescribed by the law for the officers of the United States." Thus, an officer of the army of the United States, detailed to fill a civil office in one of these States, gives no official bond and takes no official oath for the performance of his new duties, but as a civil officer of the State only takes the same oath which he had already taken as a military officer of the United States. He is at last a military officer performing civil duties, and the authority under which he acts is Federal authority only, and the inevitable result is, that the Federal Government, by the agency of its own sworn officers, in effect, assumes the civil government of the State.

A singular contradiction is apparent here. Congress declares these local State governments, and then provides that the illegal governments are to be carried on by Federal officers, who are to perform the very duties imposed on its own officers by this illegal State authority. It would be a novel spectacle if Congress should attempt to carry on a legal State government by the agency of its officers. It is yet more strange that Congress attempts to sustain and carry on an illegal State government by the same Federal agency.

In this connection, I must call attention to the tenth and eleventh sections of the bill which provides that note of the officers or appointees of these military commanders "shall be bound in their action by any opinion of any civil officer of the United States, and that all the provisions of the act shall be construed liberally, to the end that all of the intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out." Its seems Congress supposed that this bill might require construction, and they fix, therefore, the rule to be applied. But where is the construction to come from? Certainly no one cane be more in want of instruction than a soldier or an officer of the army detailed for civil services perhaps the most important in a State, with the duties of which he is altogether unfamiliar. This bill says he shall no be bound in his action by the opinion of any civil officer of the United States.

The duties of the office are altogether civil but when he asks for an opinion of another military officer, who perhaps understands as little of his duties as he does himself; and as to his "action," he is answerable to the military authority alone. Strictly, no opinion of any civil officer, other than a judge, has a binding force; but these military appointees would not be bound, even by a judicial opinion.-They might very well say, even when their action is in conflict with the Supreme Court of the United States, "that court is composed of civil officers of the United States, and we are not bound to conform our action to any opinion of any such authority." This bill, and the acts to which it is supplementary, are all founded upon the assumption that these ten communities are not States, and that their existing governments are not legal.

Throughout the legislation upon this subject they are called Rebel States. And in this particular bill they are denominated "so-called States," and the vice of illegality is declared to pervade all of them. The obligations of consistency bind a legislative body as well as the individuals who compose it. It is now too late to say that these ten political communities are not States of the Union. Declarations to the contrary in these acts are contradicted again and again by reputed acts of legislation enacted by Congress from the year 1861 to the year 1867. During that period, whilst these States were in actual rebellion, and after that rebellion was brought to a close, they have been again and again recognized as States of the Union. Representation has been apportioned to them as States. They have been divided into judicial districts for the holding of district and circuit courts of the United States, as States of the Union, only can be districted.

The last act on this subject was passed July 23, 1866, by which every one of these ten States was arranged into districts and circuits, they have been called upon by Congress to act through their Legislature upon at least two amendments to the Constitution of the United States; as States they have ratified one amendment which required the vote of twenty-seven States of the thirty-six then composing the Union, when the requisite twenty-seven votes were given in favor of that amendment, seven of which votes were given by seven of these ten States. It was proclaimed to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and slavery was declared no longer to exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

If these seven States were not legal States of the Union, it follows, as an inevitable consequence, that slavery yet exists. It does not exist in these seven States, for they have abolished it also in their own State Constitutions, but Kentucky, not having done so, it would still remain in that State. But, in truth, if this assumption that these States have no legal State governments be true, then the abolition of slavery by these illegal governments binds no one, for Congress now denies to these States the power to abolish slavery, by denying to them the power to elect a legal State Legislature, or to frame a constitution for any purpose, even for such purpose as the abolition of slavery.

As to the other Constitutional Amendment, having reference to suffrage, it happens that these States have not accepted it. The consequence is that it has never been proclaimed or understood even by Congress to be a part of the Constitution of the United States. The Senate of the United States has repeatedly given its sanction to the appointment of judges, district attorneys, and marshalls for every one of these States, and yet, if they are not legal States, not one of these judges is authorized to hold a court. So, too, both Houses of Congress have passed appropriation bills to pay all of these judges, attorneys and officers of the United States for exercising their functions in these States. Again, in the machinery of the Internal Revenue laws all these States are districted, not as Territories, but as States. So much for continuous legislative recognition. The instances cited, however, fall short of all that might be enumerated.

Executive recognition, as is well known, has been frequent and unwavering. The same bay be said as to judicial recognition through the Supreme Court of the United States. That august tribunal, from first to last, in the administration of its duties in bane [UNCLEAR] and upon the circuit, has never failed to recognize these ten communities as legal States of the Union. The cases depending in that court upon appeal and writ of error from these States when the Rebellion began, have not been dismissed upon any idea of the cessation of jurisdiction.-They were carefully continued from term to term until the Rebellion was entirely subdued and peace re-established, and then they were called for argument and consideration, as if no insurrection had intervened. New cases occurring since the Rebellion, have come from these States before that court by writ of error and appeal, and even by original suit where only a State can bring such a suit. These cases are entertained by that tribunal in the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction, which could not attach to them if they had come from any political body other than a State of the Union.

Finally, in the allotment of their circuits made by the judges at the December term, 1865, every one of these States is put on the same footing of legality with all the other States of the Union. Virginia and North Carolina, being a part of the fourth circuit, are allotted to the Chief Justice. South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Florida constitute the fifth circuit, and are allotted to the late Mr. Justice Wayne.-Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas are allotted to the sixth judicial circuit as to which there is a vacancy on the bench. The Chief Justice, in the exercise of his circuit duties, has recently held a Circuit Court in the State of North Carolina. If North Carolina is not a State of this Union, the Chief Justice had no authority to hold a court there, and every order, judgement and decree rendered by him in that court were coram non judice and verdi.

Another ground on which these Reconstruction acts are attempted to be sustained is this: --That these ten States are conquered territory; that the constitutional relation in which they stood as States towards the Federal Government, prior to the Rebellion, has given place to a new relation; that their territory is a conquered country, and their citizens a conquered people, and that in this new relation Congress can govern them by military power. A title by conquest stands on clear ground; it is a new title acquired by war. It applies only to territory for goods and movable things regularly captured in war are called "booty," or if taken by individual soldiers, "plunder." There is not a foot of the land in any of these ten States which the United States holds by conquest, save only such land as did not belong to either of these States or to any individual owner. I mean such lands as did belong to either of these States or to any individual owner. I mean such lands as did belong to the pretended government called the Confederate States. These lands we many claim to hold by conquest. As to all other land or territory, whether belonging to the States or individuals, the Federal Government has no more title or right to it than it had before the Rebellion. Our own forts, arsenals, navy yards, custom houses, and other Federal property situate in those States we now hold not only by the title of conquest, but by our old title-acquired by purchase or condemnation to public use, with compensation to their former owners. we have not conquered these places but have simply "repossessed" them. If we require more sites or forts, custom houses, or other public use, we must acquire the title to them by purchase or appropriation in the regular mode. At this moment the United States, in the acquisition of sites for national cemeteries in these States, acquires titles in the same way.

The Federal courts sit in court houses owned or leased by the United States, not in the court houses of the Staees. The United States pays each of the States for the use of its jails. Finally, the United States levies its direct taxes and its internal revenue upon the property in these States including the productions of the lands within their territorial limits, not by way of levy and contribution in the character of a conqueror, but in the regular way of taxation, under the same laws which apply to all the other States of the Union. From first to last, during the Rebellion and since, the title of each of these States to the lands and public buildings owned by them has never been disturbed, and not a foot of it has ever been acquired by the United States, even under a title by confiscation, and not a foot of it has ever been taxed under Federal law.

In conclusion I must respectfully ask the attention of Congress to the consideration of one more question arising under the bill:--It vests in the military commander, subject only to the approval of the General of the Army of the Untied States, an unlimited power to remove from office any civil or military officer in each of these ten states, and the further power, subject to the same approval, to detail or appoint any military officer or soldier of the United States to perform the duties of the officer so removed and to fill all vacancies occurring in these states by either, resignation or otherwise, the military appointee thus required to perform the duties of a civil officer, according to the laws of the State, and as such required to take an oath is, for the time being, a civil officer.

What is his character? Is he a civil officer of the State, or a civil officer of the Untied States? If he is a civil officer of the State, where is the Federal power under our Constitution which authorizes his appointment by any Federal officer? If however, he is to be considered a civil officer of the United States, as his appointment and oath would seem to indicate where is the authority for his appointment vetoed by the Constitution? The power of appointment of all officers of the united States, civil or military, where not provided for in the Constitution, is vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with this exception:--that Congress may by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. But this bill within the meaning of the Constitution, does not provide for their appointment by the President alone, or by the courts of law, or in the heads of departments, but rests the appointment in one subordinate executive officer, subject to the approval of another subordinate executive officer, so that if we put this question, and fix the character of this military appointee either way this provision of the bill is equally, opposed to the Constitution.

Take the case of a soldier or officer appointed to perform the office of Judge in one of these States, and as such to administer the proper laws of the State, where is the authority to be found in the Constitution for vesting in a military or an executive officer strict judicial functions to be exercised under State law; it has been again and again decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, the acts of Congress which have attempted to vest executive power in the judicial courts or judges of the United States, are not warranted by the Constitution.

If Congress cannot clothe a judge with merely executive duties, how can they clothe an officer or soldier of the army with judicial duties, over citizens of the United states, who are not in the military or naval service.

So, too it has been repeatedly decided that Congress cannot require a State, officer executive or judicial, to perform any duty enjoined upon him by a law of the United states. How then can Congress confer power upon an executive officer of the State? If Congress could not vest in a judge of one of these States any judicial authority under the United States by direct enactment, how can it accomplish the same thing indirectly by removing the State judge and putting an officer of the United States in his place?

To me these consederations are conclusive of the unconstitutionality of the part of the bill now before me, and I earnestly conmend their consideration to the deliberate judgement of Congress.

Within a period of less than a year the legislation of Congress has attempted to strip the Executive Department of the government of some of its essential powers.

The Constitution, and the oath provided in it, devolves upon the President the power and duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. The Constitution, in order to carry out this power gives him the choice of the agents, and makes them subject to his control and supervision, but in the execution of these laws the constitutional obligation upon the President remains, but the power to exercise that constitutional duty is effectually taken away. The military commander is, as to the power of appointment, made to take the place of the president, and the General of the Army the place of the Senate, and any attempt on the part of the President to assert his own constitutional power may, under the pretense of law, be met by official insubordination.

It is to be feared that these military officers, looking to the authority given by these, rather than to the letter of the Constitution, will recognize no authority but the commander of the district and the General of the Army. If there were no other objection than this to this proposed legislation, it would be sufficient. whilst I hold the Chief Executive authority of the United States; whilst the obligation rests upon me to see that all the laws are faithfully executed, I can never willingly surrender that trust, or the powers given for its execution; I can never give my assent to be made responsible for the faithful execution of laws, and at the same time surrender that trust and the powers which accompany it to any other executive officer, high or low, or so any number of executive officers.

If this executive trust, vested by the Constitution in the President, is to be taken from him and vested in a subordinate officer, the responsibility will be with Congress, in clothing the subordinate with unconstitutional power, and with the officer who assumes its exercise. This interference with the constitutional authority of the Executive Department is an evil that will inevitably sap the foundations of our Federal system, but is not the worst evil of this legislation. It is a great public wrong to take from the President powers conferred on him alone by the Constitution. But the wrong is more flagrant and more dangerous when the powers so taken from the President are conferred upon subordinate executive officers. Over nearly one-third of the States of the Union military power, regulated by no fixed law, reigns supreme.

Each one of the five district commanders, though not chosen by the people or responsible to them, exercises at this hour more executive power, military and civil, than the people have ever been willing to confer upon the head of the Executive Department, though chosen by and responsible to themselves. They know what it is, and how it is to be applied. At the present time, they cannot, according to the forms of the Constitution, repeal these laws. They cannot remove or control this military despotism. The remedy is nevertheless, in their hands. It is to be found in the ballot and is a sure one if not controlled by fraud, overawed by arbitrary power, or from apathy on their part too long delayed.

With abiding confidence in their patriotism, wisdom and integrity I am still hopeful of the future, and that in the end the rod of despotism will be broken; the armed heel of power be lifted from the necks of the people, and the principles of a violated Constitution preserved.

ANDREW JOHNSON

Trailer: Andrew Johnson

"Vox Populi Suprema Lex"
(Column 1)

Summary: The editors mock the Repository for the "unintelligible," high-brow articles that have recently appeared in its pages. The editors suggest that the articles are reflective of the Republicans' efforts to deceive the populace and dupe it into voting for them in the fall election.

College Exercises
(Column 2)

Summary: Provides a brief synopsis of the speeches given during the commencement ceremonies at Franklin and Marshall College.
(Names in announcement: W. S. Stenger, George W. Brewer, Gen. B. F. Fisher, Rev. E. E. Higbee, Dr. S. B. Kleffer, Rev. Cyrus Cort)

Origin of Article: Intelligencer

Editorial Comment: "The commencement exercise of Franklin and Marshall College took place at Lancsaster, on Wednesday and Thursday of last week. From what we learn the exercises were unusually entertaining and interesting. The 'Goethean Greeting,' in which several of our townsmen figured, is thus reported by the Intelligencer:"

The Contest In Pennsylvania
(Column 4)

Summary: The article contends that "one vital difference" separates the Republicans and Democrats in up-coming election: the issue of black suffrage. Should the Republicans emerge victorious in that contest, it warns, "the effect will be most disastrous to the country." The Radicals, it maintains, will move forward with their plans to grant blacks the ballot through "Congressional action," thus usurping power not only from the elected authorities in the southern states but from northern ones as well.

Origin of Article: Age

Full Text of Article:

There are some points of difference in the platforms of the Democratic and Radical parties, in this State, which should not be overlooked, or forgotten by the people.-They indicate plainly and clearly the gulf that separates the organization in reference to the mode of conducting the national and state governments, and also the manner in which they believe the laws of the Commonwealth should be administered from the Supreme Bench. The Radical party has put forth a platform which cannot be justified or defended by law, reason, or right, and hence the appeals that are made to passion and prejudice. They are conducting the campaign as if the nation was still in the midst of a war. The same old party cries are heard, men are denounced as "disloyal," and "traitors," and "sympathizers with the rebellion," who dare to exercise their reason and defend those principles which they thing best calculated to aid the country at this crisis in its history. The Radicals are afraid to test their positions on all the various questions of national and state policy by the calm judgements of the people, hence the violent manner in which their journals and speakers are beginning the campaign.

But, despite their efforts to prevent it, the people will contrast the platforms and ask which is best suited for he country under present circumstances? The Democratic party declares, with reference to national issues, that the Union of the States is perpetual, and the Federal Government supreme within its constitutional limits; that representation in Congres is a right pertaining to the people of each State, and essential to our form of Government; that its denial is the destruction of the government itself, that interference with the right of the people of a State to choose its own depositories of political power is usurpation and an outrage, and to this join the announcement that they are opposed to any amendment to the Constitution of the State giving negroes the right of suffrage. This is the plain, republican platform of the Democratic party. If the principles enunciated therein prevail, the hand of military despotism will be lifted from the people, the States will be admitted to constitutional and proper relation with the Federal government, fresh life and animation will be infused into business, taxes reduced, and the general prosperity of the nation improved in a most material degree.

In opposition to this constitutional, just, and reasonable platform, the Radical party place a full endorsement of the military reconstruction acts of the Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Congresses. These acts are in open violation of the Constitution, and are so declared by Mr. Stevens, who is the leader of the party; and by them, they have destroyed ten States, placed the military above the civil power in time of peace, suspended courts of justice, closed the doors of legislative halls, raised to full citizenship a particular class of persons in opposition to the expressed will of ninth-tenths of the legal citizens of the Southern States, and now proclaim their intention of invading the Northern States and forcing negro suffrage here, if necessary, at the point of the bayonet. The effects of such principles when carried into action, can be seen in the present condition of the country. The Union is destroyed, the character of the nation injured abroad, our commerce reduced, mills and manufactories stopped, and the whole nation torn and convulsed by the conduct of the revolutionary faction now in power.

If the Radical party and its principles are endorsed by the people of Pennsylvania at the coming election the effect will be most disastrous to the country. Stimulated and emboldened by such a verdict, they will grasp still tighter the sword of military power and use it in a more general and remorseless manner. Even under present circumstances, no one of the Radical chieftains has declared that the military reconstruction acts now upon the statue books are finalities. Stevens hints at a wider application of the disfranchising principles, and Wilson and all the more prominent Radicals are in favor of forcing negro suffrage upon the people of this State by Congressional action, even while the word "white still remains at the State Constitution. If Congress can thus set aside the organic law of a State with reference to the qualifications of its citizens, they can nullify all other parts of that instrument, and thus reduce the people virtually to the condition of slaves to the power of a centralized despotism.

The contest in this State bears directly upon this point, and hence the people should look at the facts as wise men, not fanatics. The South is now governed by Congress under the military acts passed by that body. The Radicals have announced their intention of applying one feature of that policy to the Northern States. Let Pennsylvania endorse their policy this fall, and not only will they declare negroes citizens of all the States, but at the same time strike down still other safeguards of republican liberty in the North. This is one vital difference in the platform of the parties in this State. Others will be noted hereafter.-Age

New Jersey Republicanism
(Column 4)

Summary: The article praises New Jersey Republicans for casting "aside shame and pretenses" and "fearlessly and openly" admitting their support for black suffrage.

Why It Was Left Out
(Column 5)

Summary: The article reports on the turmoil caused by the failure of the Republican State Convention to include a plank endorsing black suffrage, which, according to one source, was opposed by "delegates from the interior, who thought their constituents were not prepared to face the music."

Origin of Article: Democratic Watchman

Editorial Comment: "Among the more out-spoken of the mongrel papers in this State, there seems to be quite a disposition to find fault with the proceedings of their State Convention, for not imcorporating the negro suffrage plank in their platform. It explanation of why it was left out, the Village Record, a leading mongrel journal published in West Chester says:"

Full Text of Article:

"The subject was thoroughly discussed by the committee on resolutions, the member of the committee from Bucks county making an argument in favor of the adoption of such a resolution. The expediency of this action, however, was decidedly opposed by some of the delegates from the interior, who thought their constituents were not yet quite prepared to face the music. It was suggested that the subject would at any rate be acted upon by Congress, as soon as the pending constitutional amendments would be ratified, and that the States themselves would be relieved of the responsibilities of fixing the qualifications of citizenship in this respect. Thus it came about that the suffrage plank was omitted from our State platform."

Here is a very honest and candid confession, and one too that should open the eyes of thousands of white men, who have heretofore been voting with mongrelism, but have so often asserted that they will no longer vote for that party when they are convinced that it favors negro suffrage. It is not because they are not in favor of negroes voting, not because they would keep the ballot out of his hand, and preserve the superiority of the white man, that their platform says nothing about it, but for the simple reason that they fear that the masses of their party are not quite yet prepared to face the music? Not yet prepared to acknowledge Sambo as their equal; not prepared to give Cuffee the reigns of Government; not yet prepared to march arm in arm to the ballot-box, with these sweet scented "American citizens of African descent." And yet, knowing, feeling and acknowledging that even a majority of their own party together with the hundreds of thousands of noble democrats throughout the State, are bitterly opposed to this infamous and degrading doctrine, they have the effrontery to express the desire that Congress, will "relieve the State of fixing the qualifications of its citizens," or in other words, force negro suffrage upon us, in opposition to the wishes of three-fourths of our white voters. It is to accomplish this that their candidate for Supreme Judge is pledged to make his decisions in accordance with the "wishes of those electing him." And if the white men of Pennsylvania feel that they "are not ready to face the music," and march arm in arm to the polls with an ignorant and degraded race, they must vote for those who will oppose any interference by Congress, with our laws regulating the qualifications of citizens." Williams has pledged himself to decide that Congress has the right to make negroes voters in Pennsylvania in opposition to the wishes of our people. Sharswood will decide that it is a question that the white men of our State alone can settle.-Democratic Watchman

[No Title]
(Column 6)

Summary: Announces that Simon Cameron supported Senator Sumner's proposal to strike the word "white" from Pennsylvania's Constitution.

[No Title]
(Column 6)

Summary: Radicals held an interracial picnic and quasi-political rally recently in Marysville.

Local and Personal--Franklin Female Seminary
(Column 1)

Summary: The Franklin Female Seminary is scheduled to open on Sept. 10th, under the direction of Miss Snively. In addition, Mrs. Halm will teach instrumental music at the institution.
(Names in announcement: Miss Snively, Mrs. Halm)

Local and Personal--Sudden Death
(Column 1)

Summary: Reports on the sudden death of John Stouffer, "a much respected citizen" who died of "appoplexy" after eating "an unusually hearty meal." Stouffer was 79 years old.
(Names in announcement: John Stouffer)

Local and Personal--Fatal Accident
(Column 1)

Summary: On July 25th, William Highland suffered a fatal injury while unloading hay. Somehow Highland got tangled up in a rope and was thrown to the floor of his barn. The fall resulted in injuries so serious that he was unable to recover.
(Names in announcement: William Highland)

Local and Personal--Temperance
(Column 1)

Summary: Announces an upcoming temperance meeting at the M. E. Church; Rev. Dr. Dougherty, of Mechanicsburg, will deliver a sermon there.
(Names in announcement: Rev. Dr. Dougherty)

Local and Personal--House Burned
(Column 1)

Summary: The farm house on John Price's land burned down on July 26th. The dwelling was occupied by Jacob Shank, who had been farming the land. The fire caused damages amounting to two to three thousand dollars.
(Names in announcement: John Price, Jacob Shank)

Died
(Column 5)

Summary: On June 29th, Edward, son of James H. and Mattie E. Aughinbaugh, died at 8 months old.
(Names in announcement: Edward Aughinbaugh, Mattie E. Aughinbaugh, James H. Aughinbaugh)

Died
(Column 5)

Summary: On July 20th, Clara May, infant daughter of Washington and Elizabeth Spidel, died at 6 months old.
(Names in announcement: Clara May Spidel, Elizabeth Spidel, Washington Spidel)

Died
(Column 5)

Summary: On July 21st, William Alsop, 92, died near Greencastle.
(Names in announcement: William Alsop)

Died
(Column 5)

Summary: On July 23rd, Margaret Brenner, 55, died in Middlesburg.
(Names in announcement: Margaret Brenner)