Summary:
In this dispatch, Union General Nathaniel P. Banks reports to Adjutant-General
Lorenzo Thomas on the situation facing his Corps in the Valley. He mentions
possible Confederate plans to concentrate around Staunton.
Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS, Adjutant-Gen. U. S. Army:
WOODSTOCK, VA.,
April 6.
GENERAL:
Upon receiving your dispatch announcing the creation of a new military department, embracing the valley of the Shenandoah, for my command, I thought it my duty to make to the Department of War an immediate and full statement of the forces, position, and condition of the Fifth Army Corps.
The corps consists of two divisions; the first commanded by Gen. A. S. Williams; the second commanded by Brig.-Gen. Shields. The full force of both divisions is now about 23,000 men, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Our effective force, however, at this time for operations in the valley of the Shenandoah and vicinity is reduced to 12,600. The accompanying sheet will show the positions of the main force and the various detachments that were necessarily made.
After the occupation of Winchester by my command I was ordered by Gen. McClellan to move Gen. Williams' division to Manassas for the occupation of the country in front and the reconstruction of the railway in the direction of Strasburg. My impression was that the movement was to be immediate, in order that the embarkation of troops movement to other points might not be delayed and the grand movement of the army embarrassed by a failure here.
Immediately upon my return to Winchester from Washington I put Williams' division in movement for Manassas, where I had promised it should be on the 25th of March, and, according to my instructions to precede this division, I left Winchester on the 23rd March for Manassas. The battle on that day at Winchester recalled me, and I ordered back all the brigades of the division within my reach. Abercrombie's had advanced too far, and is now at Warrenton Junction, in pursuance of my orders. This reduces my corps 4,500 men. Col. Geary's regiment, with squadron of cavalry, reduced it again 1,800 men, lessening my force in consequence of this movement 6,300 men.
Our advance from Harper's Ferry has placed under our protection 100 miles of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, 32 miles of the Winchester Railway, and the towns, villages, highways, and bridges upon a line of 70 miles, over which our trains of supply are constantly passing. In addition to this, the valley we occupy is of such a character that we are compelled to protect our flanks by detachments far in our rear, at the very head of the valley. These military necessities, not to speak of the sick, hospital attendants, &c., have reduced our effective force by a further detachment of 4,000 men, leaving, as I said, but 12,633 men for immediate action.
The enemy has from 6,000 to 8,000 men, is well supplied with both light and heavy artillery, and is supported by a regiment of very superior cavalry. They are likely to be re-enforced to some extent by the rebel forces hitherto at Fort Alleghany, about 26 miles east of Cheat Mountain, 2,600 strong, and from Monterey and one other point, Huntersville, the forces of which I do not know, but believe them not to be large.
Gen. Fremont telegraphs me they are retreating generally all along his front, with a purpose, he believes, of concentrating at Staunton. This corresponds with our information. We may reasonably look, therefore, for an increase of Jackson's force to this extent, but not much beyond. I do not believe that Johnston can safely strengthen him. Cavalry force is but about 800, mostly inexperienced men and untrained horses. The arrival of Col. Holliday's Vermont cavalry, the use of which I obtained here "for a short time," is demoralized by the suicide of the colonel at Strasburg on Friday. It will not be of value for active service, judging from the representations made to us of the condition of the prominent officers. We have so many mountain valleys to scout and such an extended line to protect that, independent of the necessity of strong cavalry in action, we need a large and efficient cavalry force. We are now greatly inferior to the enemy in this arm of the service, in which we should be stronger.
Jackson is lying between Mount Jackson and New Market. We hope immediately to strike him an effective blow. Capt. Hunt, of the Engineer Corps, will explain to you more fully than can be written the plans of action, which I hope may meet your approval.
There are no rebel forces in the mountains between the commands of Gen. Sumner and my own, except perhaps 200 or 300 scouts in different parts of the mountains. Our scouts report no rebel forces at Luray, Washington, or Sperryville, where their troops have been heretofore reported.
Gen. Johnston we believe to be at Gordonsville-perhaps farther south. Some of the deserters from the enemy report having heard it said in their camp that Johnston was within 15 miles of Richmond. These facts may be of service to Gen. Sumner.
It is of great importance on this line that we should be informed of every event that transpires on the east in front of Manassas and near Richmond. Pardon this tedious statement; I write amid many interruptions.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
N. P. BANKS,
Commanding Fifth Army Corps.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 12, Serial No. 18, Pages 48-50, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
